Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1972

Raymond Stewart v. John L. Sullivan And Richard
Monk Allen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors. David K. Wonder; Attorney for Richard Allen, AppellantDavid
E. West; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stewart v. Sullivan, No. 12958 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/255

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND STEWART,

PT,aintiff 4'114
R~,

Case No.
12958

vs.
JOHN L. SULL1VAN and
RICHARD MONK ALLEN,

DefendolnfJJ OJIU1,
Apipe1J,a,nts.

BRIE'F OF APPELLANT
JACK L. SOHOENJUIB
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 8'101
Aff.orn,ef/ for AwBllaat
JohL.8~

DAVID K. WINDER
604 Boston Bu'ilding
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for RicM,rd
Allen.,

A~t

r

M~

I L E. D

DAVID E. WEST
1800 Walker Bank Building . NOV
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ___ _

1 1qfz

Att&rn.ey f<Yr R~· Cle.i. h,-·~ Uf.i

-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
STATEMENT OF FA T .
--------------------------------

.

l
1
------------------------------- :

c s ------------------------------------------------

~~ii~~I~Ig~Gk~ Li:!~p~O~LRT

ARGUMENT ____________________________________:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 7

POINTS ON APPEAL

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ORIGINALLY ENTERED A DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE---------------------- 7
POINT II
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT ALLOW OR PROVIDE FOR
A MOTION FOR FURTHER HEARING
BEFORE RULING OF 'THE COURT------------------ 9
POINT III
A PARTY MOVING FOR RELIEF FROM
A JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF RULE 60 (b) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MUST STATE WITH PARTICULARITY
THE GROUNDS AND FACTS UPON
WHICH THE MOTION IS BASED -------------------- 11
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO AMEND THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL UPON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION AND THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRE'TION IN AMENDING SAID ORDER -------------------------------------------------- 14
A. THE TIME LIMITATION OF THREE
MONTHS BARRED THE GRANTING
OF THE MOTION ---------------------------------------------- 14
B. THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60 (b)
1-6) AND (7) ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND ·THE LATTER CANNOT BE USED TO AVOID THE TIME
LIMITATION OF THE FORMER PROVIS! 0 NS ( 1-6) ---------------------------------------------------- 16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page
C. THE "NEGLECT" SPECIFIED IN
RULE 60 (b) (1) MUST BE EXCUSABLE AND IS SUBJECT TO THE
THREE MONTH LIMITATION PERIOD. INEXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS
NOT GROUNDS FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 60 (b) (7) ------------------------------------ 18
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

CASES crTED

Blankenship v. Royalty Holding Co.,
(10th Cir. 1953) 202 F. 2d 77 ------------------------------------ 8
Carrethers v. St. Louis - San Francisco Railway Co.,
(D.C. Oki. 1967) 264 F Supp. 171 ________________________ 16, 22
Crysler v. Crysler, 5 U 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995 ------------------·- 19
DaJrymple v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co.,
(D.C. Penn. 1959 ( 24 F.R.D. 260 ------------------------------ 20
Federal Enterprises v. Frank Allbritten
Motors, (D.C. Mo. 1954) 16 F.R.D. 109 -------------------- 20
Frank v. New Amsterdam CasuaJty Co.,
27 F.R.D. 258 ------------------------------------------------------------13, 19
Geigel v. Sea Land Service, Inc.,
(D.C. Puerto Rico 1968) 44 F.R.D. 1 ---------------------- 21
Hoffman v. Colebreeze, (8th Cir. 1969) 405 F 2d 833 ------ 20
In Re Wright (D.C. Mo. 1965) 247 F Supp. 648 -------------- 20
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,
69 S Ct. 384, 93 L. Ed. 266 ------------------------------------------ 16
Ledwith v. Storkan (D.C. Neb. 1942)
2 F.R.D. 539 ____________________________________________ 13, 19, 20,21, 22
Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 U. 2d 293, 373 P. 2d 573 -------------- 19
Ohlinger v. United States, (2nd Cir. 1962)
22
308 F 2d 667 --------------------------------------------------------------20,
Rinieri
v. News
Syndicate
(2nd
Cir. 1967)
385 F.Co.,
2d 818 ________________________________ 16, 17
Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 U 2d 222, 341 P. 2d 949 ____________ 15, 16, 17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page
United States v. Karahali.as,
(2nd Cir. 1953) 205 F. 2d 331 ________________________________ 16,17
United States v. $3,216.59 in United States
Currecy, 41 F.R.D. 435 ------------------------------------------------ 13
Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding,
24 U 2d 211, 469 P. 2d 1 ________________________________________ 10, 11
Wallace v. United States (2nd Cir. 19 ) 142 F 2d 240 ____ 16
Wrren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
123 u 416, 260 p 2d 741 ________________________ 13, 14, 18, 19, 21

RULES CITED
Utah Rules of Civil Procedude Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii) ______ 7
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41 (b) ______________________ 7, 8
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b) ____________________ 14, 15
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b) (1-6) ________ 14, 15
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b) (7) ____________ 14, 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND STEWART,
Plainti/f and
Respondent,
vs.
JOHN L. SULLIVAN and
RICHARD MONK ALLEN,
Defendants and
Appellants.

Case No.
12958

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action filed by plaintiff, respondent,
claming that he was injured by the willful misconduct of the driver of the vehicle in which he was a
passenger and by the negligence of the defendant
Richard Monk Allen, the driver of the vehicle which
collfud with the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 22, 1968 at or about 4 :00 P.M. the
plaintiff, Raymond Stewart, was riding as a car pool
1
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passenger in a car being driven by the defendant John
L. Sullivan. They were proceeding South on U.S.
Highway 91. The defendant Richard Monk Allen was
driving a car which was proceeding on the same highway in the same direction.
The Allen vehicle collided with the rear end of
the Sullivan vehicle and the resulting collision overturned the Sullivan vehicle.
The plaintiff Raymond Stewart on March 20,
1969 brought action against John L. Sullivan, the
driver of his vehicle alleging willful misconduct and
against Richard Monk Allen, the driver of the other
vehicle which collided with the rear of the vehicle in
which the plaintiff was a passenger.
John L. Sullivan filed a separate action against
Richard Monk Allen for personal injuries and damages to his vehicle.
DISPOSITION IN LOWE'R COURT
The defendant Richard Monk Allen moved to
consolidate the two cases for trial. Originally the motion was denied without prejudice to renew after further discovery. The motion was made again on November 17, 1969 and was heard on November 26,
1969. The motion was granted December 2, 1969 by
the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. R.33.
On the 24th day of September, 1970, the defendant John L. Sullivan served written Interrogatories
upon the plaintiff, R. 35. The plaintiff did not an2
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swer the Interrogatories of the defendant and on the
12th day of January, 1971 almost 4 months later the
defendant John L. Sullivan moved for an Order compelling answers to the Interrogatories and for a striking of the trial setting. The motion was heard on January 19, 1971 by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson
who granted the motion and ordered as follows:
1. "'That plaintiff answer the Interrogattories submitted by defendant John L. Sullivan dated September 24, 1970 within 15 days
of the date of service of a copy of this Order
upon counsel for plaintiff." R. 42.
The plaintiff did not answer the Interrogatories
and on March 4, 1971 a motion was made by the defendant John L. Sullivan to dismiss the plaintiff's
Complaint. The defendant Richard Monk Allen made
a similar motion. The motions were noticed for hearing before the Honorabl Aldon J. Anderson on April
2, 1971. Due to a change in scheduling, the law and
motion calendar was transferred to the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson who granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. The Order provided the following:
" ... And the Court having considered the
matter and good cause appearing,
IT IS HERBEY ORDERED that plaintiff Raymond Stewart's Complaint as against
both defendant John L. Sullivan and Richard
Monk Allen be and it is hereby dismissed."
R. 50, 51.
A copy of the Order of Dismissal was served
upon plaintiff's attorney on April 2, 1971.
3
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On the 19th day of April, 1971, the Complaint of
defendant John L. Sullivan against Richard Monk
Allen in the other action was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to a mutual stipulation of the parties,
R. 52, 53.
On the 14th day of May, 1971, the attorney for
the plaintiff was suspended from the practice of law
in the State of Utah.
The plaintiff obtained a new attorney and on the
16th day of March, 1972, without notice to any of the
parties and ex parte, the plaintirf's new attorney obtained an amended Order of Dismissal which contained the fallowing language :
"A clerical error having been made in the
drafting of the Order of Dismissal herein in
that said Order omitted the words '''without
prejudice" as directed by the Court, and said
error having come to the attention of the Court,
NOW. THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule
60 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court on its own initiative corrects said error
by amending the Order of Dismissal 'to read
as follows:
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiff Raymond Stewart's 'Complaint as against
both defendants, John L. Sullivan and Richard
Monk Allen, be and it is hereby dismissed without prejudice." R. 55.
Having learned of the amended Order of Dismissal both defendants filed their Motions to Set
Aside the Amended Order of Dismissal together with
4
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A'ffidavits. The Affidavits clearly disclose that the
Court did not, on any occasion state that the original
Order of Dismissal was without prejudice and no
memorandum was made that said Order of Dismissal
was without prejudice.
On April 7, 1972 the plaintiff filed a Motion To
Amend Order of Dismissal on Additional Grounds,
R. 65, supported by an Affidavit, R. 67, in which the
plaintiff set forth in detail the procedures he had followed with his client and the attorney for Richard
Monk Allen concerning the settlement offer to be
made. The Affidavit established that contact had not
been made with the attorney for John L. Sullivan until shortly before the attorney for the plaintiff had its
original amended Order of Dismissal entered, R. 70,
71.
The Motions were heard upon notice and by stipulation of the parties on April 13, 1972 by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson who then set aside the
amended Order of Dismissal and denied plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Order of Dismissal on Additional
Grounds. The Order provided as follows:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that defendants' Motion
to set aside the Amended Order of Dismissal
is hereby granted and pl~intiff's Mot!o_n to
Amend the Order of Dismissal on Add1t10nal
Grounds is hereby denied. The ~ormer entry o_f
Dismissal previously on file m this case is
hereby reinstated." R. 97, 98.
On April 24, 1972, the plaintiff filed a Motion
5
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for Further Hearing Before Ruling of the Court. R.
88.
The Motion was heard pursuant to notice and a
stipulation by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
who granted plaintiff's Motion. Said Order provided
as follows:

" ... and the Court having reviewed all of
the files and records and affidavits herein and
hearing the arguments of counsel and having
found sufficient grounds to relieve plaintiff
from the final judgment of dismissal herein
and being fully advised in the premises,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT 'IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1. Plain tiff's Motion to Amend the Order of Dismissal herein is hereby granted and
l'T IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Complaint
as against both defendants be and is hereby
dismissed "without prejudice."
'
2. The order of May 3, 1972, granting defendants' Motion to Set Aside the Amended
Order of Dismissal herein is hereby set aside."
R. 103.
Both defendants filed their notices of appeal
from said Order and the matter is now before this
Court on appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant and appellant John L. Sullivan,
seeks a reversal of the Order entered by the District
Court, which Order changes the original Order of
6
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Dismissal with prejudice to an Order of Dismissal
without prejudice.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ORIGINALLY ENTERED
A DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
WITH PREJUDICE.

It is without dispute that plaintiff had not filed
its Answers to the Interrogatories of the defendant
even after the trial Court had entered its Order (R.
42), that said Interrogatories be answered.

A subsequent Motion was made by both defendants pursuant to Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii) and Rule 41
(b) to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint for failure to answer the Interrogatories.
The trial Court granted defendants' Motions
and entered a dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint. It
is without dispute that the trial Court did not specify
that the dismissal was without prejudice. The Order
signed and entered by the Court was as follows:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Raymond Stewart's Oompaint as against
both de:fendant John L. Sulivan and Richard
Monk Allen be and it is hereby dismissed." R.
51.

Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii) provides that for failure
of a party to answer designated questions, the Court
may make such Orders which include the following:
"·
''' (iii) an Order . . . dismissing the action ... "
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of
the Court, a defendant may move for a dismissal of an action or of any claim against him ...
Unless the Court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal nat provided for in
this rule ... operates as an adjudication upon
the merits."
Whether or not the trial Court Judge in his mind
wanted to specify the dismissal to be without prejudice is of little significance at this point. At no time
was this desire, alleged by plaintiff, expressed either
orally in Court, in the minutes or in the written Order.
In the case of B"lankenship v. Royalty Holding
Co., (10th Cir. 1953) 202 F.2d 77 where a Motion to
Dismiss (for failure to state a claim) was granted
by the trial Court, the Circuit Court held:
"Courts possess the inherent power to correct errors in the records evidencing the judgment pronounced by the Court so as to make
them speak the truth by actually reflecting
that which was in fact done. They do not, however, possess the po'Yer to .correct a~ eri;-or by
the Court in rendermg a Judgment it did not
intend to render and by such an Order change
a 'judgment actually but erroneously pronounced by the Court to one the Court in tended to record."
The allegation of plaintiff (as to the trial
8
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?o~rt's intention to render a dismissal without pre-

JUd1ce) appears to be without substance as evidenced
by the fact that upon notice and Motion of the defendants, the trial Court immediately reinstated it former Order of Dismissal with prejudice.
POINT II
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
DO NOT ALLOW OR PROVIDE FOR A MOTION
FOR FURTHER HEARING BEFORE RULING
OF THE COURT.

After plaintiff's counsel contacted counsel for
John L. Sullivan and discovered, as alleged by plaintiff that the dismissal was with prejudice the following events took place.
1. Counsel for plaintiff approached the trial
Court ex parte, without notice to either defendant
and presented to the Court and the Court signed an
"Amended Order of Dismissal which contained the
following language:
"A clerical error having been made in the
drafting of the Order df Dismissal herein in
that said Order omitted the words '''without
prejudice" as directed by the 9ourt, and said
error having come to the attention of the Court,
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule
60 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Proced~re, the
Court 'on its own initiative corrects said error
by amending the Order of Dismissal to read
as follows:
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff, Ray9
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mond Stewart's Compl.aint as against both defendants, John L. Sulhvan and Richard Monk
Allen, be and it is hereby dismissed without
prejudice." R. 55.
2. Upon learning of this Order, counsel for both
defendants immediately upon notice and motion requested the Court to reinstate its former Order of
Dismissal.
Plaintiff then moved the Court to amend the Order of Dismissal on additional grounds pursuant to
Rule 61 (b) (7). R. 65. The Court granted defendants' Motion and denied plaintiff's Motion, thereby
reinstating the original order of dismissal with prejudice.

1

3. Plaintiff then filed its Motion for further
hearing before the Court. The only new allegations
of substance made in writing were that the previous
attorney for the plaintiff had been suspended from
the practice of law in the State of Utah on May 14,
1971, a month and 12 days after the Order of Dismissal had originally been entered.
The trial Court granted plaintiff's Motion to
amend the Order of Dismissal to a dismissal without '
prejudice.
Concerning a "Motion to Reconsider" this Court
stated:
''We are unaware of any such a Motion
under our rules . . .
We think the Motion to Reconsider the
10
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Motion to vacate the pudgment is abortive under .the rule~ .... " Utah State Employees Credit
Union v. Riding, 24 U. 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1.
Obviously to allow a party to have two or more
chances at the same Motion without a showing of extraordinary circumstances is not appropriate under
the Rules.
The result of all the fore going is that the trial
Court has changed the original dismissal three times
to read as follows: 1. without prejudice, 2. with prejudice, 3. without prejudice.
POINT III
A PARTY MOVING FOR RELIEF FROM A
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MUST STATE WITH
PARTICULARITY THE GR 0 UN D S AND
FACTS UPON WHICH THE MOTION IS BASED.

Plaintiff's Motions do not specify the grounds
upon which the Motions are based. The first Motion
contains the following language:
"The Court in the above entitled case having acted upon its own initiative under Rule 60
(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to C?rr~ct
a clerical error to amend the Order of D1sm1ssal herein showing the same to be without prejudice plaintiff acknowledges the correctness
of the'Court's ruling and moves.t~at the same
relief also be granted on the additional ground
as set forth in Rule 60 (b) (7)_, Ut~h Rul~s of
Civil Procedure which Rule likewise entitles
plaintiff to the ~elief sought.
11
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This motion is based upon the files and reherein together with the Affidavit of
Neil D. Schaerrer, showing that plaintiff is
clearly entitled to said relief." R. 65, 66.
The Affidavit states geenrally that in September, 1971 (at least five months after the Order of Dismissal) that plaintiff contacted new counsel and said:
plaintiff could not get his attorney Lambert Gibson
to explain to him the status of the case. Neil D.
Schaerrer, plaintiff's second attorney, obtained the
file and apparently relied upon the statement of Mr.
Winder (attorney for defendant Richard Monk Allen) that the case had been dismissed without prejudice. In reliance upon this statement, Neil D.
Schaerrer took no further steps to amend the judgment until he contacted Jack L. Schoenhals (attorney
f01· defendant John L. Sullivan) and was informed
the dismissal was with prejudice.
cor~s

The entire Affidavit appears to be one reciting
some facts and some conclusions which all relate to
the "mistake, inadvertance, or neglect" of the counsel for the plaintiff.
The second Motion filed by plaintiff (R. 88) appears to be similar in nature to the first but apparently includes an additional theory, to wit: that plaintiff himself was unaware of the Order of Dismissal
and the Order of Suspension of his attorney from the
practice of law until the latter part of September,
1971.
The Affidavit of Lambert Gibson, R 85 (plain12
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tiff's first attorney) sates generally that he relied
upon the statement of Mr. Winder that the dismissal
was without prejudice.
In the case of United States v. $3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 435 the Court stated:
. " ... liberality cannot extend to granting
rehef, where there is no evidentiary showing
or a '·'reason" under the rule and a meritorious
de'fense ... "such an application for extraordinary relier must be fully substantiated by
adequate proof and its exceptional character
must be clearly established * * *."
The Court said the mistake of counsel must be
set forth clearly showing the nature of the mistake
with particularity. Having failed to do so the Motion
is denied.
In Ledwith v. Storkan (D.C. Neb. 1942) 2. F.R.D. 539, the Court held the grounds of excusable
neglect must be set forth with particularity.
In Frank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 27
F.R.D. 258 ( 1961) the Court stated:
'~The leading case of Ledwith v. Storkan,
supra, enunciates the basi~ proposition t~~t
the moving party must articulate the specific
reasons which constitute excusable neglect.
The defendant has only offered a genei;al c~n
clusion, it has not offered any ext~nuatmg c1:;cumstances or reasons surroundmg counsel s
failure to :follow instructions."
This Court has stated the same principles, wherein this Court said :

13
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."We are not told the nature of the illness

an~ it doe~ not appear that appellant ... was

so mcapac1taeted that he could not have called
an atorney to have his rights and the rights o'f
the corporation protected." Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741.
It is obvious from reading the Motions and Affidavits filed by plaintiff that in no way does plaintiff explain or set forth the reasons why he did not
discover until the later part of September, 1971, that
'the Order of Dismissal had been entered or that his
attorney had not answered the Interrogatories served upon him in September of 1970, or that his attorney had been suspended from the practice of law in
May of 1971. The Affidavits and Motions of Plaintiff
are void of any details whatsoever concerning these
very important points. They set forth no details explaining plaintiff's attorneys' mistaken reliance upon the belief that the dismissal was without prejudice
and their failure over the several months to read the
Order of Dismissal and determine its effect.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO AMEND THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
UPON PLAINTIFF'S M 0 TI 0 N AND THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AMENDING SAID ORDER.

A. THE TIME LIMITATION OF THRENEG
MONTHS BARRED THE GRANTI
OF THE MOTION.
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced14
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

ure provides:
"On motion ... the Court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
represent~tive from a final judgment ... for
the f ollowmg
( 1) mistake in advert. reasons:
ance, surprise,
or excusable neglect' . . . ( 7)
any ?ther reaso? justifying relief 'from the operation of the Judgment. The Motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons
( 1) , ( 2) , ( 3) or ( 4), not more than three
months after the judgment, Order or proceeding was entered or taken." (In substance this
is the same as Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure except the time limitation
in the Federal Rule is one year instead of three
months.)
Plaintiff filed its Motions to amend the Order
of Dismissal on April 7, 1972 (R. 65) and on April
24, 1972 (R. 88). Both Motions were filed more than
one year after the entry of the original Order of Dismissal (April 2, 1971). (R. 51).
Neither of the two Motions were filed within the
three month time limitation nor were they filed within a reasonable time.
In Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 U 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949,
this Court stated:
~~Pilchers attacked the whole proceedings
as being viola:tive of Rule 60 (b), Utah R:ul~s
of Civil Procedure, with its three m.o~th limitations feature relating to ~ntertammg ~o
tions for relief because of mistake, newly discovered evidence and the like. A r~ading of t.he
rule makes it apparent that a Motion for rehef
15
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based on the grounds enumerated· therein is '
ineffective if made three months after the decision from which relief is sought.

* * * *

.

The attack here being based on fraud upon the Court, and having been leveled some 17
months after the adoption decree, must have
been pursued in an independent action, and not ,
by way of Motion in the original action otherwise, the rule would not make much sense."
This Court clearly established that Motions based upon the reasons (1-6) in Rule 60 (b) must be
made within the three month limitation period.
That Motions based upon the reasons s~t forth
in Rule 60 (b) (1-6) must be made within the time
limitations specified is a rule clearly established by
the Courts. Wallace v. United States (2nd Cir) 142
F~2d 240, Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., (2nd Cir.
1967) 385 F 2d 818, United States v. Karahalia.s
(2nd Cir. 1953) 205 F 2d 331, Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 69, S.Ct. 384, 93 L Ed. 266,
Carrethers v. St. Louis - San Francisco Railway Co.,
(D.C. Okl. 1967) 264 F. Supp. 171.
B. THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60 (b)
(1-6) and (7) ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND THE LATTER CANNOT BE USED TO AVOID THE TIME
LIMITATION OF THE FORMER PROVISIONS (1-6).
In Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., (2nd Cir.
1967) 387 F 2d 818, the Court stated:
" ... Rule 60 (b) (6) (same as Utah Rule
16
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60 ( b). ( 7) ) is n?t a carte Manche to cast adrift
from fixed moormgs an~ time l!mitations guided o!11Y by t~e necessarily variant consciences
of different Judges ... and may be relied upon
only in "exceptional circumstances."
Thus it is settled that Rule 60 (b) (1)
and 60 ( b) ( 6) are not pari passu and are mutually exclusive, and that the latter section cannot ~e l}Sed to break out from the rigid time
restrictmn of the former ... we are convinced
that Rinieri has failed to bring himself within
the "extremely meagre" scope as Judge L.
Hand referred to it of Rule 60 (b) (6)."
In United States v. Karahalias, (2nd Cir. 1953)
205 F 2d 331, the Court stated:
Nin this Petition for a rehearing the United States raises two points, the first of which
is that we were wrong when we said that as to
Karahalias ''there is no doubt that his ground
for relief is 'excusable neglect;' " and also when
we said subsection ( 6) of the Rule 60 (b)
should be read '''as giving the Court a discretionary dispensing power over the limitation
imposed by the Rule itself on subsections ( 1),
(2) and (3)." Both these statements, the Petition says, were contrary to the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L Ed. 266, and
we agree ... we must also retract the construction put upon subsection ( 6), and hold that no
"neglect" however excusable, will survive the
limitation of Rule 60 (b) ."
As has been previously cited in this Brief (Shaw
v. Pilcher, supra) this Court has ruled that a motion
based upon Rule 60 (b) (3) must be brought within
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

three months, "otherwise, the rule would not make
much sense."
Although plaintiff would like to characterize its
Motions as being grounded upon facts which bring it
within the provisions of Rule 60 (b) (7), it is obvious
that the basis of the Motions is '''neglect, mistake or
inadvertance," clearly all within the bounds and three
rnon th limi ta tion of Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) and therefore
excluded from the provisions of paragrph ( 7).
It was clearly beyond the authority of the Court
and it constituted an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to amend the Order of Dismissal based upon
plaintiff's Motions and Affidavits.

C. THE "NEGLECT" SPECIFIED IN RULE 60
(b) ( 1) MUST BE EXCUSABLE AND IS SUBJECT TO THE THREE MONTH LIMITATION PERIOD. INEXCUSABLE NEGLECT
IS NOT GROUNDS FOR RELIEF UNDER
RULE 60 (b) (7).
1. The Motions and Affidavits of plaintiff
must of necessity refer to two or more acts o! neglect.
The first act of neglect by plaintiff's counsel was its
failure to answer the Interrogatories. Concerning
this neglect, the plaintiff's Affidavits merely state
that plaintiff's attorney was busy and apparently
just did not get around to answering the Interrogatories. The Affidavits do not disclose any ''excusable"
neglect. This Court stated in Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Co., 123 U 416, 260 P 2d 741:
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

:'we are not told the nature of the illness
it does no~ appear that appellant Arnold
Dixon was so mcapacitated that he could not
have .called an attorney to have his rights and
the rights of the corporation protected....
And although a judgment may be eITOneous and inequitable, equitable relief will not
be granted to a party thereto on the sole ground
that the negiigenc~ of the attorney, agent, trustee or representative of the present complainant prevented a fair trial."
This Court refused to reverse the trial Court's
ruling which denied a Motion to set aside a default
judgment where the plaintiff's attorney knew of the.
trial setting but did not appear. Chrysler v. Chrysler,
5 U 2d 415, 303 P 2d 995. See also Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 U 2d 293, 373 P 2d 573.
a~d

In Frank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 27
F.R.D. 258 (1961) where the attorney failed to file
a Mot'ion for a new trial or an appeal the Court said:
"Defendant centends that its counsel's
omission constitutes excusable neglect within
the term of ... 60 (b) ( 1). The Court finds
that the defendant's view is untenable. An
'omission or any carelessness on the part of
counsel does not automatically constitute '"excusable neglect" as the term is employed in
Fed. R Civ. P. 60 (b) (1).

* * * *

The leading case or L_edwith v .. $torkan,
supra, enunciates the bas1~ proposition *~t
the moving party must articulate the specific
reasons which constitute excusable neglect.
The defendant has only offered a general con19
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clusion; it has riot offered any extenuating circu!llstances or reasons surrounding counsel's
failure to follow instructions. This Court
therefore concludes that this omission without
a further showing of extenuation doe~ not constitute "excusable neglect" withi~ the purview
of Fed. R Cir. P. 60 (b) (1) ."
See also Dalrymple v. Pittsburgh Consolidation
Coal Company, (D.C. Penn. 1959) 24 F.R.D. 260,
where the Court said you must show neglect is excusable. See also Ohliger v. United States (2nd Cir.
1962) 308 F 2d 667, where the Court found no excusable neglect and stated that mere ignorance of
Court's rules of procedures does not constitute excusable neglect. For other cases with similar rulings see
the following: Hoffman v. Celebreeze (8th Cir. 1969)
405 F 2d 833; In Re Wright (D.C. Mo. 1965) 247 F
Supp. 648; and Federal Enterprises v. Frank Allbritten Motors, (D.C. Mo. 1954) 16 F.R.D. 109.
2. The second act of neglect specified by plaintiff was the failure of its first and second attorney
to understand the nature of the dismissal - that it
was with prejudice; and there is an inference that
the two atorneys somehow relied on the statement of
Mr. Winder that ''he thought" the case was dismissed
without prejudice.
Concerning this concept of ''neglect," where a
moving appellant employed an attorney who called
plaintiff's atorney and was told "he would be allowed
a longer time in which to file his Answer." This Court
said:
20
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. "Sucfi a promise, if given, could in no way
bmd a chent .who already had a judgment."
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. 123 U 416 260
p 2d 741.
'
'

It must be observed that this "reliance' 'theory of
plaintiff is founded upon conversations with Mr.
Winder which occurred sometime after the entry of
the judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
In Geigel v. Sea Land Service, Inc. (D.C. Puerto
Rico 1968) 44 F.R.D. 1, the plaintiff's Complaint had
been dismissed for failure to answer Interrogatories.
The Court stated:
useful purpose of the principle of
finality of judments requires that the Court
scrutinize the Motion for relief and the grounds
upon which it is based. II judgments are vacat~
ed on tenuous and insignificant grounds they
will lack finality and there will be no end to
litigation.
Petitioner voluntarily chose the attorney
as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any
other notion would be wholly inconsistent with
our system of representative litigation, in
wnich each party is deemed b<;>und b)'. the acts
of his lawyer - agent and is considered to
have notice of all facts, notice of which can be
charged upon the attorney."
In Ledwith v. Storkan, (D.C. Neb. 1942) 2F.R.D. 539 the Court said:
'''Carelessness and negligence is not akin to
excusable neglect ...
'~The

21
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. Negligence of counsel is imputed to his
chent."
In Ohlinger v. United States, (2nd Cir. 1962)
308 F 2d 667 the Court held that ignorance of Court's
rules of procedure is not excusable neglect.

In Carrethers v. St. Louis - San Francisco Railway Co., (D.C. Okl.1967) 264 F. Supp.171, the
Court held that inexcusable neglect was not available
as grounds for relief under Rule 60 (b) (6) (same
as our ( 7) ) and should not be given special treatment. The Court made the following observation:
"I'f ''''excusable neglect" cannot be raised 1
P,Xcept within a year (3 months under our
rules) then certainly inexcusable neglect
should not be given more favorable treatment
and thus cannot be said to be "any other reason justifying :relief" under Rule 60 (b) (6). '
In other words, inexcusable neglect which
here also amounts to contributory fault by the
plaintiff will not provide the necessary extraordinary circumstances to warrant the extraordinary relief afforded by Rule 60 (b) (6)."
Why the plaintiff himself did nothing about his 1
legal action for almost one year is not explained in
the Affidavits but we can only assume was the result
of inexcusable neglect upon his part, amounting to
contributory negligence.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff and his attorney for some unexplained reason, failed to answer the Interrogatories
served upon them on September 29, 1970 (even after
22
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Order of the trial Court), allowed a dismissal to be
entered and failed to read the Order to determine its
effect. One year after the Interrogatories had hen
served the plaintiff retained a new attorney who,
with his attorney, waited until a year after the dis-missal had been entered before any attempt was made
to attack the Order. On the part of both the plaintiff
and his attorneys it is obvious they were extremely
neglectful. Having failed to show their neglect was
excusable and having filed their motions more than
three months after the entry of dismissal had been
entered, they were not entitled to attack the Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice. The trial Court was without authori'ty to change the original Order and abused its discretion in disturbing the year old Order. This
Court should correct the error of the trial Court and
reinstate the original Order of Dismissal with Prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK L. SCHOENHALS

721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant

John L. Sullivan

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

